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Mineral Law-SURFACE CONFLICTS-MINERAL LESSEE HELD LIA- 
BLE FOR DEPRECIATED VALUE OF LAND UNDER "GROWING CROPS" 
LEASE PROVISION-F~~~~~  Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 
(Utah 1976). 
Flying Diamond Corporation (Flying Diamond) held a lease 
for the oil and gas rights on the property of Anthon Rust.' Flying 
Diamond attempted to commence development of the minerals2 
on Rust's property by constructing an access road and an oil and 
gas well site. With the aid of the sheriff, Rust prohibited the 
operations and ordered Flying Diamond from the pr~per ty .~  
Thereafter Flying Diamond brought an action against Rust, 
seeking a preliminary injunction to restrain Rust from further 
interference with the mineral development, an order to show 
cause as to why a permanent injunction should not be issued, and 
damages .' 
The temporary injunction was issued, whereupon Flying Dia- 
mond proceeded with the construction. Rust then brought a coun- 
terclaim for damages, alleging trespass, a taking by eminent 
domain,5 and unreasonable and excessive use of the surface by 
Flying Diarn~nd.~ The trial court dismissed Flying Diamond's 
1. Rust's estate was actually held jointly with his wife. Both Flying Diamond and the 
Rusts obtained their severed interests from third parties. Brief of Appellant a t  1-2, Flying 
Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976). 
2. The word "minerals" in an instrument includes gas and oil. Patterson v. Wilcox, 
11 Utah 2d 264, 265 n.2, 358 P.2d 88, 89 n.2 (1961); Western Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 
112, 114-15, 288 P.2d 452, 453-54 (1955). 
3. Trial Record at 14, 16. 
4. Flying Diamond sought damages of $1000 for defendant's initial interference with 
operations and $2,500 per day for each day it was prohibited from entering the property. 
Plaintiffs Complaint. 
5. Rust's third cause of action and prayer stated: 
In the event that the Court shall not award the defendants the foregoing 
relief, defendants pray that they be awarded reasonable compensation for the 
taking of their property under the Eminent Domain Statutes of the State of 
Utah in sum of $61,000.00, together with punitive damages in the sum of 
$30,000.00. 
Defendant's Answer & Counterclaim. Rust's claim for compensation for the use of the 
surface by the mineral owner, alleged to be a taking under Utah's eminent domain stat- 
utes, may have contributed to the confusion concerning the rights of the parties. Utah is 
one of the few states to designate mining as a use for which property may be taken under 
eminent domain powers. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-1 (Supp. 1975); Ferguson, Severed 
Surface and Mineral Estates-Right to Use, Damage or Destroy the Surface to Recover 
Minerals, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 411, 431 (1974). The courts may have felt that 
the mineral owner should pay for any surface used as required in eminent domain. Emi- 
nent domain is, however, inapplicable when a party already has the right to use the 
surface. 
6. Rust also claimed $30,000.00 in punitive damages, alleging that Flying Diamond 
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complaint, holding that the surface owner was entitled to two 
awards of damages. First, Rust was entitled to compensation 
based on a "growing crops" lease provision for the reasonable 
value of 5.88 acres of property taken in construction of the access 
road and well site.' Second, Rust was entitled to compensation 
for the depreciated value of 15 acres, the irrigation of which had 
been disrupted by the placement of Flying Diamond's access 
road? The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower 
A. Dominance of the Mineral Estate 
Mineral and surface estates may become separated" in var- 
ious ways;" oil and gas rights, however, are usually severed from 
the fee by a lease between the mineral lessee and the holder of 
the fee estate. The lease form may vary considerably but usually 
acted maliciously and with a wanton disregard of his rights. 
7. Memorandum Decision Civil No. 5035, District Court of Duchesne County, 4: 
Defendant is entitled to compensation for the reasonable value of the 5.88 
acres of land taken for the well site and road, under paragraph 10 of the lease 
dated April 6, 1964. The Court believes that the lands taken had thereon grow- 
ing crops at the time within the meaning of that term in the lease, and that the 
lessee agreed in the lease to pay the lessor damages thereto. The use of the land 
taken by plaintiff for the well site and the road is effectively and permanently 
denied to the surface owner for any use theretofore made of the land, and the 
Court holds that such damage is the fair market value of the land a t  the time it 
was taken which is determined to be the sum of $900.00 per acre, totaling 
$5,292.00. 
8. The trial court stated: 
1. The location of the road where it was located was not reasonably neces- 
sary, and unreasonably interferes with the surface owners' preexisting use of the 
surface making it virtually impossible for him to irrigate a portion of his land. 
2. Such unreasonable interference depreciated the value of approximately 
15 acres of defendants' surface rights in the amount of $750.00 per acre, totaling 
$11,250.00. 
Memorandum Decision Civil No. 5035, District Court of Duchesne County, 77 1-2. 
9. Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976). 
10. Ownership of the mineral rights separate from the fee estate is not a recent 
concept. See Ferguson, supra note 5. Under common law the "royal mines," those contain- 
ing gold and silver, belonged exclusively to the crown despite the surface ownership resting 
in a subject. 1 C. LINDLEY, A TREATISE ON THE AMEMCAN LAW RELATING TO MINES AND 
MINERAL ANDS § 3, at 7-9 (3d ed. 1914). As early as 1900 Utah recognized that the 
minerals could be held by someone other than the surface owner. Smith v. Jones, 21 Utah 
270, 278, 60 P. 1104, 1106 (1900). 
11. The mineral estate may be severed from the fee estate by a federal mineral 
reservation, a state mineral reservation, or a private mineral grant or reservation. See 
Fleck, Severed Mineral Interests, 51 N.D. L. REV. 369 (1974). 
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grants the lessee the right to explore and develop the oil and gas 
on the subject property for a specified time. If at the end of the 
specified time period either gas or oil is still being commercially 
produced, the lessee may continue operations until the minerals 
are exhausted. Of course, the lessor will continue to receive roy- 
alty payments for as long as the minerals are produced.12 
The estates of the lessee and lessor under oil and gas leases 
have been consistently characterized respectively as the domi- 
nant and servient estates.13 The lessee has an implied grant, ab- 
sent an express provision for payment, to use so much of the 
leased premises as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the pur- 
poses of the lease without an obligation to pay for damages.14 
Because the oil and gas lease grants extensive rights to the lessee, 
it has even been regarded as a grant of the land itself.15 
The dominance of the leasehold estate is based on the con- 
cept that "when a thing is granted, all the means to obtain it and 
all the fruits and effects of it are also granted? Pursuant to 
these rights the lessee has been allowed to locate his wells where 
he desires," to build roads to the drill site,18 to construct and use 
storage and processing facilities for the oil and gas, l9 to dig ditches 
for the removal of wastes,20 and to use fresh and salt water from 
the premises in secondary recovery  operation^,^' all without legal 
liability for damages to the servient surface estate.22 
12. See, e.g., 6 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 1160 (1967). 
13. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971); Flying Dia- 
mond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976); Davis, Selected Problems Regarding 
Lessee's Rights and Obligations to the Surface Owner, 18 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 315, 
316 (1963). 
14. Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886,511 S.W.2d 160 (1974); Dunn 
v. Southwest Ardmore Tulip Creek Sand Unit, 548 P.2d 685 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Sun 
Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972); Texaco, Inc. v. Spires, 435 S.W.2d 550 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1968). 
15. Gray, A New Appraisal of the Rights of Lessees Under Oil and Gas Leases to Use 
and Occupy the Surface, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 227, 256-57 (1975). 
16. 4 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 652 (1958). 
17. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 137 Tex. 59,82,152 S.W.2d 711,724 (1941); 
see Felmont Oil Corp. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 334 S.W.2d 449, 456 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1960); Stephenson v. Glass, 276 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Ct. App. 1925); Grimes v. Goodman 
Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202 (Tex. Ct. App. 1919) (finding the erection of an oil derrick on 
the same lot as a residential house, the placement of a slush pit next to the house, and 
the operation of the well so as to splash oil on one side of the house all to be reasonable). 
18. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958); Adkins v. 
United Fuel Gas Co. 134 W. Va. 719, 61 S.E.2d 633 (1950). 
19. See Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 73 Wyo. 321, 278 P.2d 798 (1955). 
20. See Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 134 W. Va. 719, 61 S.E.2d 633 (1950). 
21. See Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1973); Sun Oil 
Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972). 
22. See Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEX. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1956). 
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B. Restraints on the Mineral Estate 
The mineral lessee's broad rights, however, are subject to the 
restraints of contract and tort liability.23 
1.  Liability in Tort 
The courts have imposed a duty upon the mineral lessee to 
use only so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary, having 
due regard for the rights of the surface owner, to effectuate the 
purpose of the lease.14 Damages for breach of this duty have been 
upheld on a variety of tort theories.15 For example, damages have 
been awarded in nuisance where an oil and gas lessee failed to 
restore the surface of the land after abandoning a well site; such 
failure amounts to a taking of more surface than is reasonably 
necessary and therefore creates liability for the cost of clean up.16 
Negligence has been a basis for damages where the lessee con- 
ducted operations during a wet period, resulting in substantial 
injury to the surface? Unreasonable location of a drill site has 
been recognized as a ground of recovery where the lessee con- 
structed a well site upon the very location that the surface owner 
had selected for the building of his retirement home.18 Courts 
have allowed recoveries under a broad range of findings that the 
surface use or injury was not reasonably necessary or that the 
mineral lessee did not exercise his rights with due regard to the 
surface owner's rights.29 
23. Scott, Oil and Gas Lease Clauses Relating to Surface Damage and Use of the 
Surface, 13 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 317, 317 (1967). 
24. Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974); Blue 
v. Charles F. Hayes & Assoc., 215 So. 2d 426 (Miss. 1968); Dunn v. Southwest Ardmore 
Tulip Creek Sand Unit, 548 P.2d 685 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 
S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972); Macha v. Crouch, 500 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973); Com- 
ment, Concurrent Right to Surface Use in Conjunction with Oil and Gas Development in 
Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REV. 655, 656 (1973). 
25. See Keeton & Jones, supra note 22. 
26. E.g., Tenneco Oil Co. v. Allen, 515 P.2d 1391 (Okla. 1973). 
27. E.g., Illinois Basin Oil Ass'n. v. Lynn, 425 S.W.2d 555 (Ky. 1968); see 4 W. 
SUMMERS, supra note 16, § 652. 
28. Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974). But 
see Grimes v. Goodman Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202 (Tex. Ct. App. 1919). 
29. The courts have awarded damages to the surface owner upon a finding that the 
mineral developer made unreasonable use of the surface in connection with water- 
flooding; disposal of wastes; exploratory operations on adjacent tracts; seismographic 
tests; location, construction, and maintenance of well sites, slush pits, ditches, storage 
tanks, reservoirs, pickup stations, buildings, pipelines, and roads; and the use of the 
surface for shutdown and removal operations. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 16 (1973). These 
recoveries, based on a finding of unreasonable use, are indistinguishable from awards 
made upon conventional negligence, nuisance, and trespass theories, since these conven- 
tional torts are in fact based upon findings of unreasonable use of the surface. 
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2. Liability in Contract 
An oil and gas lease is a contract, and as such determines the 
respective rights of the parties.30 The parties to the lease fre- 
quently include a clause requiring the lessee to pay for any dam- 
age caused to specific items such as land, livestock, growing 
crops, or  improvement^.^^ Liability under such a contract arises 
upon the terms of the contract and is not dependent upon any 
proof of tort." The lessee agrees to pay the surface owner for 
injuries to his property "independent of breach of contract or 
liability for tort."" Therefore, if the item is identified in the lease, 
damages may be awarded. Problems of recovery under a lease 
clause do arise, however, in determining what items are included 
within the definition of a particular term. 
The term "growing crops" in a mineral lease has frequently 
been the subject of litigation. It is generally agreed that growing 
crops includes wheat, corn, alfalfa, and other products of the soil 
that are raised and gathered annually.34 The jurisdictions differ, 
however, when considering natural products of the soil such as 
range and native grasses. The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
natural products of the soil are growing crops within the provi- 
sions of an oil and gas lease;35 other courts have concluded that 
natural products of the soil such as native grasses on uncultivated 
lands used for cattle grazing are not crops under a mineral lease.36 
Courts have consistently held that the use of a growing crops 
clause in a mineral lease cannot justify an award of damages for 
injury to land as contrasted with injury to crops growing on the 
30. Dilworth v. Fortier, 405 P.2d 38, 50 (Okla. 1964); see Fast v. Kahan, 206 Kan. 
682, 481 P.2d 958 (1971). 
31. For example: "Lessee shall be liable and agrees to pay for all damages to the land, 
livestock, growing crops, or improvements caused by lessee's operations on said lands." 
Frankfort Oil Co. v. Abrams, 159 Colo. 535, 539, 413 P.2d 190, 192 (1966) (state granted 
lease). 
32. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Grucholski, 376 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1964); Primier Petroleum Co. v. Box, 255 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953), aff'd per 
curium, 152 Tex. 321, 257 S.W.2d 105 (1953). 
33. Meyer v. Cox, 252 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952). The statement by the 
court that liability arises independent of breach of contract is intended to be used in a 
very narrow sense. If the mineral owner refuses to pay for damages as required under the 
contract, the surface owner will sue on breach of contract. What is meant by liability 
independent of contract, however, is that liability for damages as provided for in the lease 
arises before any breach of contract occurs. 
34. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 13, at  340-43 (defining the term "crops"). 
35. Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976); Francis v. Roberts, 73 
Utah 98, 272 P. 633 (1928). 
36. Wohlford v. American Gas Prod. Co., 218 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1955); Union Produc- 
ing Co. v. Allen, 297 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. Ct. App. 1957) (dictum). 
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land. In the recent decision of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Morris,37 
the Texas court of appeals considered an oil and gas lease provi- 
sion that required payment by the lessee for any injury to crops.38 
The lessee had used 4.23 acres of surface for the location of a well 
site and access road. After the lessee ceased operations, the sur- 
face owner attempted to produce crops on the abandoned surface. 
Because of the lessee's prior operations, however, the soil was 
unproductive and the crops failed. The surface owner brought an 
action against the lessee for damage to his crops, claiming that 
the lessee was contractually liable for the damage by reason of the 
lease provision under which the lessee agreed "to pay for the 
damage to crops."3B Although the appellate court recognized that 
damage to the fertility of the soil resulted in injury to future 
it held that "lessee was not liable to lessors for the loss of 
anticipated future crops occasioned by damage to the soil" under 
the lease agreement and, therefore, the award for injury to the 
fertility of the soil was in error.41 Other courts considering the 
question have similarly concluded that a damage-to-crops clause 
in a lease is not a basis for an award for injury to the land or future 
crops. 42 
One exception to the general rule discussed above arises 
when the damaged crops are trees. In these cases damages are 
determined by the use of the "depreciation in value" method. For 
example, in Cities Service Gas Co. v. C h r i ~ t i a n , ~ ~  the court al- 
lowed damages equal to the decreased value of the land when the 
lessee's operations destroyed pecan trees growing on the land.44 
37. 518 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975). 
38. The applicable lease contained the following clause: "The Lessee agrees to pay 
for damages to crops or improvements caused by operations of Lessee." Id. at  445. 
39. Id. at  444. 
40. The Texas court of appeals explained the relationship in these terms: "Texas 
courts have made a clear distinction between damage to crops and damage to the fertility 
of the soil, which in turn, results in a failure to produce or a reduction in production of 
future crops." Id. at 446. 
41. Id. 
42. See Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So. 2d 253 (La. Ct. App. 1958) 
(award for crop damage upheld but award for injury to land reversed); cf. Transconti- 
nental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Hill, 57 So. 2d 162 (Miss. 1952) (pipeline easement clause 
allowing payment for damages to fences, improvements, growing crops, and timber did 
not include payment for destruction of top soil where it was necessary to remove or destroy 
the same in the proper laying of a pipeline); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Baccus, 11 S.W.2d 355 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1928) (arbitration award based on pipeline easement contract providing 
payment for damage to crops or fences in error if award includes injury sustained to land). 
43. 340 P.2d 929 (Okla. 1959). 
44. "The rule for measuring damages arising from injury or loss of trees is the value 
of the premises upon which the trees grew immediately prior to the destruction and the 
value immediately thereafter." Id. a t  937 (citations omitted). 
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The court made clear, however, that it applied this rule only to 
trees.45 As to the other crops destroyed (grasses), the court al- 
lowed no recovery for future crops or for injury to productivity of 
the soil,46 and approved the procedure employed by the trial court 
wherein the award was based on expert testimony as to the actual 
value of the crops as they stood.47 
The trial court in the instant case based the award for the 
5.88 acres taken for the road and drill site upon the growing crops 
lease provision that provided that the lessee would "pay for dam- 
age directly and immediately caused by its operations to growing 
crops theretofore planted on said land."48 The supreme court af- 
firmed this award, but did not address the major issue raised by 
the appellant of whether the award was proper under the growing 
crops clause." Instead, the supreme court erroneously perceived 
the trial court's award of the value of the 5.88 acres to be based 
on a finding that the use of the land by the mineral lessee was 
unreasonable50 and upheld the award on that ground. 
The supreme court also upheld the award for the diminished 
value of the 15 acres of irrigated land resulting from placement 
of the access road. Here, however, the court pointed to the grow- 
ing crops clause of the lease as if it were the basis for the trial 
court's second award,51 although the trial court had based its 
award for the 15 acres on a finding that the access road had been 
unreasonably placed.52 The supreme court found that clover, al- 
45. Id. 
46. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed a disallowance by the trial court of 
"[dlamages resulting from loss of future crops through land . . . being rendered non- 
productive for a number of years . . . ." Id. at  933. 
47. Id. a t  936-38. 
48. 551 P.2d at 511. 
49. See Brief of Appellant at  12-20. 
50. The trial court expressly stated: 
There is not sufficient evidence from which the court can find, with regard 
to the amount of land taken, that the 5.88 acres of surface "taken" for the well 
site and the road was in excess of that reasonably necessary, or that use of such 
amount by plaintiff is unreasonable to accomplish the purposes contemplated 
by the lease. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 7 7?- at  3. 
51. 551 P.2d at 511-12. The court referred to the growing crops provision as if Flying 
Diamond had contended it was incorrectly used in relation to the 15 acres. Flying Dia- 
mond's references were entirely made, however, in respect to the award for the 5.88 acres. 
See Brief of Appellant a t  12-20. 
52. See note 8 supra. 
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falfa, and natural grasses on defendant's land were crops within 
the meaning of the growing crops clause and that the trial court 
was justified in including the value of future crops in computing 
damages for the 15 acres injured by unreasonable placement of 
the roadway.53 
The instant case significantly extends the rights of surface 
owners; it  appears to be the first instance allowing a surface 
owner to recover for the depreciated value of his land under a 
growing crops damage clause despite a finding that the mineral 
lessee's use was reasonable. This case note will first show that 
neither the trial court's award in respect to the 5.88 acres used 
as an access road and drill site nor the supreme court's affirma- 
tion in respect to the 15 acres of irrigated land were properly made 
under the growing crops damage clause of the lease. The case note 
will then examine the possibility that the awards could have been 
granted in tort. 
A. Liability Under the Lease Provision for Damage to Growing 
Crops 
If a court were to extend a growing crops lease provision to 
allow recovery for future crops, damages could be accurately mea- 
sured by the decrease in present value of the land for agricultural 
production. The supreme court in the instant case evidently 
adopted this approach and allowed damages for future crops in 
the amount of the diminished present value of the land for agri- 
cultural purposes. This holding, however, is inconsistent with the 
treatment given this issue by other courts that have interpreted 
similar clauses. The uniform response of the courts is exemplified 
by Phillips, where the court disallowed an award for injury to the 
fertility of soil under a growing crops clause. 
The Phillips holding is clearly preferable. The term "growing 
crops implies that it applies only to crops growing on the land at 
the time of injury. Most courts have interpreted this language 
literally and have concluded that the lessee under such a clause 
is liable only for actual damages to growing crops resulting from 
development operations and not for injury to the land.54 This 
interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the lessor has the 
53. 551 P.2d at 511-12. 
54. See notes 34-47 and accompanying text supra. 
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option of requiring that the lessee be liable for damage to land, 
making an award for the decrease in value appr~priate.'~ If the 
lessor fails to require a provision for payment for injury to land, 
the growing crops clause can hardly be stretched to achieve that 
result. 
Moreover, the language of the lease in the instant case stated 
that  the lessee would pay for damage to growing crops 
"therefore planted on said land."56 The addition of the word 
theretofore demonstrates that the parties to the lease did not 
intend that the lessee be liable for crops that might later be grown 
on the land. 
Although the respondent cited Cities Service in support of 
the trial court's award of the entire depreciated value of the 5.88 
acres," a close reading of that  case indicates that the 
depreciation-in-value rule was applied only when the "crops" 
were trees.58 As to the other growing crops such as grasses, the 
Cities Service court allowed damages only for the actual value of 
the crops as they stood. Since the respondent in the instant case 
did not claim damage to trees, the court could not have properly 
relied upon Cities Service to award an amount equal to the dim- 
inished value of the land. 
Consequently, based upon the clear meaning of the growing 
crops clause and the weight of authority holding that such a 
clause requires payment for the value of the crop as injured but 
not for any injury to the future productivity of the land, neither 
the supreme court's award for the depreciated value of the 15 
acres that resulted from location of the access road nor the trial 
court's award for the value of the 5.88 acres used as a well site 
and access road can be upheld under the growing crops provision 
of the lease. 
The Utah Supreme Court should have applied a rule of mea- 
surement that would have reflected accurately the value of the 
injured crops growing on Rust's property and not the decreased 
value of the land for agricultural purposes. The- clover, alfalfa, 
and natural grasses injured in the instant case were all perennials 
used for grazing." For determination of damages to similar per- 
ennial crops, an estimate by an expert with special knowledge 
55. See note 31 supra (clause including damage to land). 
56. 551 P.2d at 511 (emphasis added). 
57. Brief of Respondent at 19-20. 
58. See notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra. 
59. 551 P.2d at 511. 
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concerning the value of the crops for pasturage has been used.60 
The instant case should have been remanded for the taking of 
similar testimony of the value of the crops as they stood for graz- 
ing separate from the depreciated value of the land as used for 
future crop production. 
B. Alternative Grounds for Recovery in Tort 
Although the award for injury to the 15 acres could not have 
been properly justified under the lease provision, grounds for the 
award existed in tort. Since the trial court found the location of 
the access road to be unreasonable because it interfered with 
preexisting irrigation patterns, damages could appropriately have 
been awarded in tort for the actual amount that the land had 
depreciated in value.61 In attempting to justify the award in con- 
tract through a tortured definition of growing crops, the Utah 
Supreme Court failed to distinguish the two forms of liability and 
unnecessarily broadened the scope of contract liability. 
Although there was an alternative ground for the award for 
the depreciated value of the 15 acres, no basis existed for award- 
ing damages for the entire value of the 5.88 acres taken as a well 
site and access road. Since the trial court expressly stated that it 
did not find the well site to be unreasonable in its location, use, 
or amount of surface taken,62 there were no tort grounds upon 
which damages could have been based. Damages, if any, would 
have to be based upon the growing crops clause of the lease and, 
as discussed above,63 the only damages allowable would be for the 
actual value of the crops then growing on the land. The trial court 
did find that the access road was unreasonably located, but not 
unreasonable as to the amount of land used.64 Although an award 
might have been made for the difference in value between the 
land actually used for the access road and the land that should 
have been used, there was no legal basis for an award for the 
entire value of the land. 
60. See, e.g., Cities Services Gas Co. v. Christian, 340 P.2d 929, 936 (Okla. 1959). 
61. See Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974); 
Union Producing Co. v. Pittman, 245 Miss. 427, 436, 146 So. 2d 553, 556 (1962) (diminu- 
tion in value of real property is proper measurement for wrongful injury). A finding of 
unreasonable use is sufficient grounds for an award in tort. The plaintiff is not limited to 
the conventional theories of negligence, nuisance, or trespass. See note 29 supra. 
62. Note 8 supra. 
63. See notes 37-42, 54-58 and accompanying text supra. 
64. Notes 8 & 50 supra. 
534 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1977: 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The rules of law that govern the respective rights and duties 
of the owners of the surface and mineral estates reflect a carefully 
developed balance between two conflicting interests. The rules 
attempt to preserve the rights of the mineral owner to the use of 
so much of the surface land as is reasonably necessary to the 
development of his property. At the same time, however, the 
courts have allowed the parties to agree through contract on what 
actions will result in liability, and have also imposed liability 
when the mineral lessee has acted unreasonably. 
Prior to this decision, a surface owner suing under a growing 
crops lease provision could recover only for the value of the crops 
which were destroyed. The instant case greatly expands the sur- 
face owner's rights to include recovery for the depreciation in 
value of the land resulting from the lessee's operations. This in- 
terpretation is unsupported by prior precedent, and contravenes 
the basic rules of construction. Moreover, it was probably unnec- 
essary in this case since the court could have reached the same 
result-at least as to the 15 acres-if traditional tort theories had 
been correctly applied. 
